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INTRODUCTION
Currently, more than forty-one million people are enrolled in the
Medicaid program, including one out of every five children in the
United States.1  Medicaid has been the principle source of health
insurance for low-income and indigent people since the enactment of
the “Medicaid Act,” which is Title XIX of the Social Security Act of
1965.2  Although Medicaid recipients long have relied on the federal
courts to enforce, privately, their right to certain Medicaid benefits,3
their ability to effect private enforcement in federal courts may be in

1. See Health Care Financing Administration, A Profile of Medicaid: Chartbook
2000, 12, 13 (Sept. 2000), available at http://www.hcfa.gov/stats/2Tchartbk.pdf (last
visited Jan. 3, 2002).  According to the Health Care Financing Administration, the
Medicaid program is the third largest source of health insurance in the United
States, after employer-based coverage and Medicare, and is the largest program in
the federal “safety-net” of public assistance programs.  Id. at 7.
2. Social Security Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (1994).  42 U.S.C. § 1396
(1994) states:
For the purpose of enabling each state . . . to furnish (1) medical assistance
on behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or
disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet
the costs of necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other
services to help such families and individuals attain or retain capability for
independence or self-care, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for
each fiscal year a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this subchapter.
See also Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 7, 8 (2001) (describing the Medicaid program, its major challenges, and
prospects for reform).  According to Professors Rosenbaum and Rousseau, Medicaid,
for the past thirty-five years, has been the “legislative vehicle” for a vast number of
policy initiatives, including reducing infant mortality, improving child health care,
maintaining health services for the elderly and the disabled, and advancing
treatment for those with HIV/AIDS, cancer, tuberculosis, and mental illness.  Id. at 9-
10.  See generally Health Care Financing Administration, Medicaid: A Brief Summary, at
http://www.hcfa.gov/pubforms/actuary/ormedmed/default4.htm (last visited Jan.
3, 2002) (providing an overview of Medicaid, including a description of those
persons eligible for Medicaid services and the types of services the Medicaid program
provides).
3. See Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under § 1983:
The Supreme Court’s Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 283, 320 (1996) (tracing the use of § 1983, first applied in 1980, to enforce
rights created by federal law, such as those contained in the Medicaid Act); see also
Leonard Weiser-Varon, Injunctive Relief From state Violations of Federal Funding
Conditions, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1243-44 (1982) (describing the courts as a forum
for redress of state violations of Spending Clause conditions, especially those
conditions that require the state to provide Aid to Families with Dependant Children
(AFDC) and Medicaid services).
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jeopardy.  In Westside Mothers v. Haveman,4 a federal district court
judge presented a framework for barring Medicaid recipients from
bringing such citizen suits.5  This proposition has sent shock waves
throughout the public interest community.6
By ruling that Medicaid recipients are barred from private
enforcement of their right to Medicaid services, Westside Mothers
creates the dangerous possibility that Medicaid can no longer be
considered health insurance.7  As Professor Sara Rosenbaum suggests,
“the ability to enforce your right to benefits is the essence of
insurance.  Without that ability, you no longer have health
insurance.”8  More practically, Supreme Court adoption of the
Westside Mothers rationale would eviscerate private enforcement of

4. 133 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Mich. 2001).  Westside Mothers is currently on
appeal in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, docket number 01-1494.  The case has
been fully briefed and oral arguments have been scheduled for January 24, 2002 in
Cincinatti, Ohio.  E-mail from Robin Sumner, Associate, Dechert, Price & Rhoads
(Nov. 29, 2001) (on file with author).
5. See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (ruling that state sovereign
immunity bars private Medicaid enforceability suits and that § 1983 fails to provide a
cause of action).
6. See Robert Pear, Ruling in Michigan Bars Suits Against State Over Medicaid, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 2001, at A18 (reporting the Westside Mothers decision and the reaction
it received, including the supposition that this case would end the public’s
conception of Medicaid as health insurance).  The National Senior Citizens Law
Center, Michigan Poverty Law Program, and even the conservative American
Enterprise Institute are all publishing reports, on their respective websites, on
Westside Mothers.  While some public health interest groups view this case as an
ominous threat to the enforcement of rights to health care, more conservative
groups have heralded it as a blow for state’s rights and a step towards true federalism.
Compare National Senior Citizens Law Center, Court Declares Medicaid Statute
Unenforceable, at http://www.nsclc.org/westside.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2002)
(describing Westside Mothers as the “first fruits” of a “wholesale attack on the ability of
private parties to enforce federal laws against states”), and Lisa Ruby, Westside
Mothers v. Haveman: Children’s Health Care Crisis, ¶ 4, at http://www.mplp.org
/materials/newsletter/01Spring/publicbenefits1htm.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2002)
(stating that Westside Mothers “would effectively preclude Medicaid recipients and
beneficiaries of other federal programs from suing states to force them to provide
services mandated by federal law”), with Michael S. Greve, Federalism, Yes, Activism,
No., FEDERALIST OUTLOOK, ¶ 14 (July 2001), available at http://www.aei.org/fo/
fo13092.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2002) (stating that the proposition of Westside
Mothers—that federal programs enacted under the Constitution’s “spending clause”
are not the supreme Law of the Land and therefore are unenforceable in federal
court unless a state has specifically waived its defenses against private lawsuits—is
“exactly right”).
7. See Pear, supra note 6, at A18 (describing possible implications of the Westside
Mothers decision).  In addition to eliminating the ability of Medicaid recipients to
enforce their right to Medicaid benefits, Part II.C of this Comment argues that the
reasoning of Westside Mothers may extend to a vast array of state-administered federal
entitlement programs.  This would deprive millions of people of the ability to use the
courts to challenge state interference with federal entitlements.  See infra Part II.C.
8. See Pear, supra note 6, at A18 (quoting Professor Rosenbaum’s reaction to the
Westside Mothers decision and her conclusion that “[i]f the ruling stands, it is the end
of the Medicaid program as a source of insurance”).
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Medicaid requirements and other federal funding conditions.9  This
is especially problematic given the vast number of occasions in which
Medicaid recipients are forced to resort to federal litigation against a
state to secure compliance with the Medicaid Act.10
Persons who qualify for Medicaid are entitled to receive a wide
range of free medical services.11  The Medicaid program is a federal-
state cooperative effort created pursuant to Congress’ spending
power.12  It is administered by the states, which are obligated to

9. See infra Part I.D (describing the Westside Mothers rationale and how it can be
used to bar the private enforcement of Medicaid requirements).  This statement
does not apply to the private enforcement of federal funding conditions where a
state has waived its Eleventh Amendment privilege of sovereign immunity.  This is
because the Eleventh Amendment only bars suits against non-consenting states.  See
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (recognizing that “if a
state waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar the action”); see also infra note 65 (describing the history
and scope of the Eleventh Amendment).
10. See, e.g., Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Health, 261 F.3d 970 (10th Cir. 2001)
(contending that delay in the provision of Medicaid waiver services to eligible
Medicaid participants is permissible); Concourse Rehab. & Nursing Ctr. Inc. v.
Whalen, 249 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2001) (alleging that operators of residential nursing
facility were underpaid for rehabilitative services in violation of federal Medicaid
Act); HCMF Corp. v. Allen, 238 F.3d 273 (4th Cir. 2001) (challenging Medicaid
reimbursement rates as applied by the State of Virginia); Am. Soc’y of Consultant
Pharmacists v. Garner, 2001 WL 893822 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2001) (contending that the
formulas the State of Illinois used to pay providers of prescription drug services to
Medicaid recipients violates the Medicaid Act); Mertz ex rel. Mertz v. Houstoun, 155
F. Supp. 2d 415 (E.D. Pa.  2001) (alleging that the State of Pennsylvania’s denial of a
Medicaid applicant’s application for benefits violated the Medicaid Act); Dajour B. v.
City of New York, 2001 WL 830674 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2001) (arguing that the State of
New York failed to provide adequate EPSDT services for homeless children with
asthma, in violation of the Medicaid Act).
11. See Health Care Financing Administration, Medicaid: A Brief Summary, ¶ 15, at
http://www.hcfa.gov/pubforms/actuary/ormedmed/default4.htm (last visited Jan.
3, 2002).  In addition to the typical doctor visits for illness or injury, Professors
Rosenbaum & Rousseau point out that the federal Medicaid program extends well
beyond the average health insurance plan.  See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 2,
at 13.  For instance, Medicaid provides eligible beneficiaries with long-term personal
care services, respite care, and case management.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(A)
(1994); Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 2, at 13.  Another unique feature of the
Medicaid program is that it provides for medical services and benefits to any
beneficiary, regardless of whether the beneficiary suffers from a chronic condition or
a completely correctable illness or injury.  See 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (2000);
Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 2, at 14.  In contrast, conventional health
insurance plans, typically, only cover those services that are necessary to “restore
normal functioning” following an illness or injury.  See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra
note 2, at 14.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994) (authorizing the appropriation of federal funds
to enable each state to provide medical assistance to those who cannot afford such
assistance on their own); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990)
(describing Medicaid as a cooperative federal-state program).  Article I, section 8,
clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to “lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States.”  This language is generally considered the
source of Congress’ spending power.  But see David E. Engdahl, The Basis of the
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provide certain prescribed services once they accept federal Medicaid
funds.13  A serious legal issue arises out of this arrangement—what
happens when a state fails to meets its obligations?14
The Medicaid Act itself provides for a simple remedial scheme by
which the federal government can withhold Medicaid funds from a
state that fails to abide by federal requirements.15  In addition to this
scheme, beneficiaries of the Medicaid program, since the early 1980s,
have been suing state officials on their own in federal courts to
compel the states to fulfill their Medicaid obligations.16  Complainants
assert their causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,17 a nineteenth-
century civil rights law that authorizes suits against state officials who
violate rights secured by federal law or the federal Constitution.18

Spending Power, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 215, 216 (1995) (arguing that Article IV of the
Constitution, the Property Clause, suffices to authorize all federal spending).
13. See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 2, at 17 (describing the structure of
the Medicaid program).
14. See Key, supra note 3, at 284 (identifying the problem of states failing to meet
their Medicaid obligations and arguing that the Supreme Court’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983
jurisprudence does not give Congress the deference it deserves as a co-equal branch
of government); see also Weiser-Varon, supra note 3, at 1239 (describing the remedies
available to beneficiaries of federal grant-in-aid programs and criticizing the
Supreme Court’s limitations on retroactive and prospective remedies).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (1994) provides that:
If the Secretary, after reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing to the
state agency administering or supervising the administration of the state plan
approved under this subchapter, finds (1) that the plan has been so changed
that it no longer complies with the provisions of section 1396a of this title; or
(2) that in the administration of the plan there is a failure to comply
substantially with any such provision; the Secretary shall notify such state
agency that further payments will not be made to the state (or, in his
discretion, that payments will be limited to categories under or parts of the
state plan not affected by such failure), until the Secretary is satisfied that
there will no longer be any such failure to comply.
See also Key, supra note 3, at 292 (noting the federal government’s option to cut off
funds is often the only enforcement mechanism that the federal government
possesses to ensure compliance with the provisions of federal Spending Clause
programs, which is one reason the federal government has not had much success in
achieving such compliance).
16. See Key, supra note 3, at 302 (recounting the evolution of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as
a means to privately enforce federal rights); see also Weiser-Varon, supra note 3, at
1248 (describing the remedies available to beneficiaries of grant-in-aid programs).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any state or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress
This section was enacted as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13.
18. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1981) (stating that § 1983 allows a
remedy for violation of federal statutory law as well as constitutional law); see also Key,
supra note 3, at 302-06 (describing § 1983 as indicative of the Reconstruction-Era
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Despite the longtime use and Supreme Court recognition of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as a basis for private enforcement of Medicaid rights,
Westside Mothers has closed the door on such suits in the Eastern
District of Michigan.19  More strikingly, Westside Mothers has provided
an analytic framework to be used as persuasive caselaw in other
private Medicaid suits.20  In the case, Judge Robert H. Cleland initially
ruled that the state sovereign immunity doctrine bars such citizen
suits, relying on the Supreme Court’s earlier characterization of
federal Spending Clause legislation as a contract and the Court’s
recent federalism jurisprudence.21  According to Judge Cleland, the
Supremacy Clause22 does not encompass the federal Medicaid Act
because Congress possesses no power to force the states to participate
in federal Spending Clause (or “grant-in-aid”) programs.23  Judge

shift in political philosophy away from state autonomy and towards the power of the
federal government, which, after the Civil War, “was seen as the protector of
individual rights from state infringement and abuse”; noting § 1983 was passed
specifically to give individuals a federal right that could be enforced in federal courts,
distrusting the states’ own ability or willingness to enforce the privileges and
immunities guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment).
19. See Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 587 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(barring the private enforcement of Medicaid requirements against states that have
agreed to accept federal Medicaid funds).
20. See, e.g., Joseph A. v. Ingram, 262 F.3d 1113, 1123 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing
Westside Mothers as persuasive authority to deny private enforcement of provisions of
Title IV and Title XX of the Social Security Act against the State of New Mexico);
Bonnie L. ex rel. Hadsock v. Bush, 2001 WL 1580127, *6 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2001)
(holding the comprehensive statutory and regulatory provisions of Titles IV and XX
of the Social Security Act “demonstrate that Congress meant to preclude reliance on
the broad provisions of an Ex parte Young suit to enforce the federal statutory
standards governing state child adoption and welfare services”).  While Ingram and
Bonnie L. are, more accurately, each an application of the limitation placed on the Ex
parte Young doctrine by Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), see infra
note 79, the citation to Westside Mothers indicates the potential for other courts to
adopt that decision’s arguments that are more dangerous to private enforcement
suits.  For several federal district court decisions that reject the Westside Mothers
rationale, see infra note 99.
21. See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 562.  Judge Cleland stated:
Because congressional enactments pursuant to the Spending Power . . .
depend on the voluntary agreement of participating states and are not
within the ambit of the Supremacy Clause, they are not the supreme law of
the land, and suits cannot be brought against state officials under Ex parte
Young to enforce those requirements.
Id.  The Supreme Court first discussed the contractual nature of Spending Clause
legislation in Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)
(“Pennhurst I”).  See infra Part I.A.  Judge Cleland also relied heavily upon the Court’s
recent federalism jurisprudence, especially Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
stating “the Supremacy Clause enshrines as ‘the supreme Law of the Land’ only
those federal Acts that comport with the constitutional design,” which he believed
opened the door to a new conception of Spending Clause legislation as non-supreme
federal law.  See infra Part I.D.
22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
23. See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (citing Brogdon v. Nat’l
Healthcare Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 2000)) (holding
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Cleland considered the Ex parte Young24 exception to sovereign
immunity,25 but ruled that exception could not be used to obtain
prospective injunctive relief against officers of the State of Michigan
in a federal court.  This is because the Ex parte Young exception
requires that the federal law alleged to have been violated be
supreme federal law.26  It is thus Judge Cleland’s ruling—that
Spending Clause legislation is not supreme federal law—that is the
truly groundbreaking decision with respect to Ex parte Young.
Furthermore, Judge Cleland, relying on his earlier ruling that the
Medicaid program is a contract between the state and federal
governments, held that even if sovereign immunity were not an
obstacle, Medicaid recipients are merely third-party beneficiaries of
that contract.  As such, Judge Cleland determined that § 1983
provided them no cause of action.27

congressional enactments under the spending power do not preempt state law).
Judge Cleland buttresses this proposition, hypothesizing that should Michigan elect
not to participate in the federal Medicaid program and instead opt to administer a
similar program using its own state funds and its own guidelines, “Michigan’s
guidelines would not be preempted by the competing federal Medicaid program,
because a state’s participation in Medicaid is entirely volitional.”  Id.
24. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  The terms “Ex parte Young exception,” “Ex parte Young
doctrine,” and “Ex parte Young remedy” are used interchangeably throughout this
Comment.
25. See infra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining the rationale of the Ex
parte Young doctrine).  Section 1983 merely provides a cause of action, but plaintiffs
who bring suit against a state government must still overcome the bar of sovereign
immunity.  See id.  The Ex parte Young doctrine allows plaintiffs to accomplish this by
suing state officials in their official capacity, instead of the state itself.  In accordance
with this doctrine, plaintiffs need only ask for prospective injunctive relief from
violation of a supreme federal law.  See id.
26. See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 562.  Judge Cleland further ruled the
Ex parte Young doctrine could not be used to overcome the sovereign immunity bar
because (1) the State of Michigan was the real party in interest; (2) the defendant
state officers’ alleged violations were within the scope of discretionary functions; and
(3) the funds-cutoff remedial scheme provided by the Medicaid Act is more limited
than what the court might order under Ex parte Young, which, under Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 571 U.S. 44, 74 (1996), precludes the Ex parte Young remedy.
Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 573-75.  See infra note 79 and accompanying text
(discussing the Seminole Tribe limitation upon Ex parte Young).  These additional
rulings by Judge Cleland are in-and-of-themselves questionable, but a detailed
discussion of each is beyond the scope of this Comment.
27. See id. at 579 (“Section 1983 cannot possibly create a cause of action for third-
party donee beneficiaries to a contract, because it is not unambiguously clear that
such a right existed at the time the statute was enacted [in 1871].”).  Judge Cleland
also ruled (1) in 1871, states could not be sued for breaches of contract; (2) in 1871,
agency law did not permit state officers to be sued for “the contractual breaches of
their employing states”; and (3) any rights created by the Medicaid Act are “secured”
by state, not federal law, because no right to Medicaid services exists until the state
agrees to participate in the Medicaid program.  See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d
at 577-78, 581-82.  These rulings are all based on Judge Cleland’s premise that
Medicaid is a contract between the state and federal governments.  See infra Part I.D
(describing in greater detail the Westside Mothers holding).
PLATTPP.DOC 1/31/2002  11:46 AM
280 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:273
This Comment seeks both to clarify several issues that were
presented yet muddled in Westside Mothers and to establish an analytic
framework for maintaining Ex parte Young and § 1983 as a means of
enforcing federal civil rights.  Part I of this Comment describes the
Medicaid program and the traditional manner in which citizens
previously enforced Medicaid provisions in federal courts.  Part I also
explores the relevant sovereign immunity issues and how the Westside
Mothers decision has built upon the Supreme Court’s “New
Federalism”28 to bar such suits.  Part II applies classic contract theory
analysis to the Medicaid program in an effort to more thoroughly
analyze the nature of the relationship between the federal and state
governments under the Medicaid Program.  This Comment

28. The term “New Federalism” has been used to refer to the Supreme Court’s
recent interpretations of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth, Eleventh, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.  See David C. Feola & David R.
Fine, The “New Federalism”: Ignore It at Your Peril, COLO. LAW., Nov. 2000, at 5
(summarizing the important “New Federalism” cases and advising practitioners on
how to avoid the problems presented by these cases).  See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding that Congress did not
appropriately use its enforcement authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to abrogate state sovereign immunity when it passed Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (ruling that
Congress exceeded its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it
abrogated state sovereign immunity in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (finding that the
Commerce Clause did not empower Congress to enact the Violence Against Women
Act of 1994); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Article I of the
U.S. Constitution does not grant Congress the power to subject a state to private suit
in its own courts); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999) (reasoning that the State of Florida could not be liable for
intellectual property infringement because neither the Lanham Act nor the Patent
Remedy Act validly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (ruling that a federal law requiring state officers to
conduct background checks on handgun purchasers violated the Tenth
Amendment); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (finding that
neither the Commerce clause, nor any other Article I power grants Congress the
authority to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity in federal court); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that Congress acted beyond its
Commerce Clause authority by enacting a federal law criminalizing the possession of
a firearm in a school area).
The conventional wisdom among legal commentators is that the Supreme Court,
through its recent federalism cases, is making a concerted effort to address the
interests of the states at the expense of the federal government.  See Ann Althouse,
On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court’s New Federalism, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 245,
245-46 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has evolved from a
“normative, structural analysis” to a states’ rights approach).  However, Professor
Herman S. Schwartz argues that the Court’s allegiance to states’ rights is a disguised
effort to undermine both the civil rights revolution and the New Deal.  Herman
Schwartz, The Supreme Court’s Federalism: Fig Leaf for Conservatives, 574 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 119, 120 (2001).  According to Professor Schwartz, the debate
over the balance of power between the states and the federal government is merely
superficial, and the outcome of the Supreme Court’s federalism cases is more a
function of the race and class interests involved.  See id.
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concludes from the contract analysis that even if the Medicaid Act
does not begin as supreme federal law,29 it becomes supreme once a
state accepts federal funds and assures the federal government that it
will comply with that law.  Therefore, the Ex parte Young doctrine and
§ 1983 should be maintained as the only means for Medicaid
recipients to vindicate their federal right under the program.  This
Comment then briefly discusses the enormous implications for all
beneficiaries of Spending Clause programs if the Supreme Court
adopts the rationale of Westside Mothers.  Finally, it concludes that the
Supreme Court should instead adopt the contract analysis set forth in
Part II.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Medicaid Program and the Supreme Court’s Characterization of
Spending Clause Programs
The Medicaid program is a federal-state cooperative effort,
enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power, for the “purpose of
providing federal financial assistance to states that choose to
reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons.”30

29. While this Comment acknowledges that the concept of non-supreme, yet
constitutional, federal law is troubling and has little support outside a certain circle
of conservative constitutional theorists, this Comment assumes the validity of the
concept for purposes of analysis.  However, the ultimate conclusion—that the
Medicaid Act should remain enforceable by Medicaid recipients—and the contract
analysis are both applicable whether or not the Supreme Court affirms the concept.
Should the Court dismiss the very notion of non-supreme, yet constitutional, federal
law, the contract analysis still serves to create a more precise conception of the
Medicaid Act as both a creature of contract and federal law.  It also should be noted
that despite the lack of supporting precedent, at least one constitutional scholar
believes that the Rehnquist Court is headed in the direction of stratifying federal law
into supreme and non-supreme varieties.  See Michael S. Greve, Federalism, Yes,
Activism, No., FEDERALIST OUTLOOK (July 2001), available at http://www.aei.org/
fo/fo13092.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court has
“indicated” that, soon, it will likely hold Spending Clause legislation is not supreme
federal law).  See generally MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW
IT COULD HAPPEN 78 (1999) (extolling the virtues of “noncooperation” between the
state and federal governments and of limiting the private enforcement of federal
entitlement statutes).
30. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301, 311 (1980) (holding that a state that
participates in the Medicaid program is not obligated under Title XIX of Social
Security Act to continue funding those medically necessary abortions for which
federal reimbursement was unavailable under the Hyde Amendment).  See also
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502, 524 (1990) (holding that the Boren
Amendment to the Medicaid Act created substantive federal rights enforceable
under § 1983).  See generally David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 62
(1994) (exploring the Supreme Court’s spending power jurisprudence and
proposing that Spending Clause legislation does not fall under the ambit of the
Supremacy Clause).
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To obtain federal funds, a state must submit to the U.S. Secretary of
Health and Human Services (the “Secretary”) a state Medicaid plan
that contains a “comprehensive statement describing the nature and
scope of the State’s Medicaid Program.”31  If the state’s plan fulfills
the conditions set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a), then the Secretary
must approve the plan and grant federal funds to help the state
implement it.32  In addition to the requirements of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a), each state’s Medicaid plan must contain an “assurance
that it will be administered in conformity with the specific
requirements of Title XIX, the regulations [promulgated pursuant to
Title XIX], and other applicable official issuances of the
[Secretary].”33
With regard to the mechanics of the Medicaid program, the
Supreme Court has stated that Medicaid, like other Spending Clause
legislation, is “much in the nature of a contract.”34  In Pennhurst State

31. 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (2000).  See Harris, 448 U.S. at 308 (recounting the
mechanics of the Medicaid program and explaining that once a state agrees to
establish a Medicaid plan that satisfies the requirements of Title XIX, the federal
government will pay a specified percentage of the state’s costs); see also Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“Pennhurst I”) (“[O]ur cases
have long recognized that Congress may fix the terms on which it shall disburse
federal money to the states.”).  As will be shown in Part II.A, the submission of the
state Medicaid plan can be deemed an offer by the state to enter into a contract with
the federal government.
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (1994) (“The Secretary shall approve any plan which
fulfills the conditions specified in subsection (a) of this section . . . .”); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396b (1994) (detailing the federal grants that a state is entitled to once its plan is
approved).  This approval, as will be argued in Part II.A, should be viewed as an
acceptance of the state’s offer to enter into a contract.  All of the terms of the
contract are embodied within the state Medicaid plan.  See infra Part II.A.
The Medicaid Act is flexible, allowing states a good deal of discretion in crafting
their Medicaid plans.  See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 2, at 20-23 (describing
the requirements of the Medicaid Act and the discretion afforded to states in
determining eligibility).  It is, therefore, possible for a state to vary the administration
of its Medicaid plan and in doing so, breach its contract with the federal
government.  However, such a breach may not be so great as to violate the provisions
of the Medicaid Act.
33. 42 C.F.R. § 430.10.  Part II.B.1 of this Comment argues that this assurance is
of special significance in overcoming the sovereign immunity bar imposed by Westside
Mothers.
34. Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 17 (“[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending
power is much in the nature of a contract:  in return for federal funds, the states
agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”).  In Westside Mothers, Judge
Cleland heavily relied upon the language, “much in the nature of a contract,” to
hold that Spending Clause legislation is of lesser authority than other federal laws.
See infra Part I.D.  It should be noted, however, that the Pennhurst I Court said no
such thing.  As indicated in Part II.A, the analogy to contract was used to resolve a
dispute over the clarity of a condition placed upon receipt of federal funds.  Indeed,
the Court’s language in Pennhurst I can be taken to mean that Spending Clause
legislation is also in the nature of “something else” as well.  That is precisely the
argument made by the plaintiffs and dismissed by Judge Cleland in Westside Mothers.
See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 558.
PLATTPP.DOC 1/31/2002  11:46 AM
2001] WESTSIDE MOTHERS 283
School & Hospital v. Halderman,35 the Court used its contract analogy
to hold that the conditions placed on federal Spending Clause
programs must be stated clearly and unambiguously, in a manner
that empowers a state’s knowing acceptance.36  Absent such a clear
statement, a condition placed upon receipt of federal funds is not
enforceable.37  The Court has subsequently used the contract analogy
to hold that such conditions are only enforceable against those
entities in a position to accept or reject federal funds,38 and to hold
that such conditions cannot be coercive.39  The Court has also
recognized that the federal government’s spending power can be
used as a carrot, urging a state to enact legislative programs that
Congress could not otherwise mandate using its coercive powers
enumerated in Article I of the U.S. Constitution.40

35. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
36. See Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 17 (“The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate
under the spending power thus rests on whether the state voluntarily and knowingly
accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”).  In Brogdon v. Nat’l Healthcare Corp., 103 F.
Supp. 2d 1322, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 2000), this language was used by Judge Harold L.
Murphy to hold that the Supremacy Clause does not operate upon the regulatory
scheme promulgated under the Medicare and Medicaid Acts.  According to Judge
Murphy, state laws that conflict with Medicare and Medicaid Acts do not become
void once a state agrees to accept federal funds.  Id.  For a critique of this argument,
see infra note 99 (criticizing the use of Pennhurst I as authority for the non-supremacy
of Spending Clause legislation).
37. See Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 17, 25; see also Engdahl, supra note 30, at 70
(discussing Pennhurst I and the requisite clarity of congressional intent to impose
conditions on grants of federal funds).
38. See U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 606
(1986) (holding that the scope of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is limited to
those who actually receive federal financial assistance).
39. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (“Our decisions have
recognized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress
might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”
(quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937))).
40. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (holding that the
“take-title” provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, requiring states
to accept ownership of waste or regulate according to instructions of Congress, lies
outside Congress’ enumerated powers and is inconsistent with the Tenth
Amendment).  After invalidating the statute in New York, the Court qualified its
position, stating:
This is not to say that Congress lacks the ability to encourage a State to
regulate in a particular way, or that Congress may not hold out incentives to
the States as a method of influencing a State’s policy choices. Our cases have
identified a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which
Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with
federal interests.
Id.
The use of the spending power has also been proposed as a way to circumvent
other “New Federalism” holdings, such as City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519,
536 (1997) (holding that Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power
under § 5 of Fourteenth Amendment in enacting Religious Freedom Restoration
Act).  See Brett D. Proctor, Note, Using the Spending Power to Circumvent City of Boerne
v. Flores: Why the Court Should Require Constitutional Consistency in its Unconstitutional
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B. Section 1983:  The Typical Private Medicaid Enforceability Suit
The Medicaid Act provides only one means by which the federal
government can enforce a state’s Medicaid obligations.41  If the
Secretary is satisfied that a state has failed to comply substantially with
any of the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a, then the Secretary may
withhold all or some of the federal Medicaid grants.42  However, the
Act does recognize that individual Medicaid recipients have certain
rights and, therefore, mandates that participating states provide
certain administrative procedures for recipients who believe they
have been wrongfully denied care.43  In addition, the Supreme Court
has made it clear that the Medicaid Act provides no implied cause of
action for Medicaid recipients to enforce their right to certain
services.44
In addition to the two enforcement mechanisms prescribed by law,
the Supreme Court has recognized since 1980 that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
provides a cause of action for Medicaid recipients to sue state officers
for failing to comply with conditions placed on federal spending
programs.45  In Maine v. Thiboutot,46 the Supreme Court was forced to

Conditions Analysis, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 469-70 (2000) (arguing that the Spending
Clause should not be construed to empower Congress to accomplish functionally
through conditional grants to states, what the Supreme Court has denied by other
means).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c; see also Key, supra note 3, at 292-93 (describing the
enforcement mechanism available to the federal government and arguing that it is
an ineffective means of securing state compliance).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c; see also Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 52 (White, J., dissenting
in part) (arguing that a funds cutoff is a drastic remedy with injurious consequences
to the supposed beneficiaries of the a grant-in-aid program); Key, supra note 3, at
292-93 (arguing that the federal government’s ability to withhold funds is an
inadequate means of enforcing Spending Clause conditions).  Specifically, Professor
Key argues that federal agencies focus more on providing funds to participating
states than on enforcing conditions, causing compliance and enforcement to receive
a low priority.  See id.  Key also argues that a cutoff of funds is such a drastic remedy
that it is “rarely, if ever, invoked.”  Id.  According to Key, these federal agencies know
that a funds cutoff is not likely to help anyone and would destroy the state’s program.
Id.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) provides that:
A state plan for medical assistance must provide for granting an opportunity
for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for
medical assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon with
reasonable promptness.
44. See Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 17 (holding that conditions placed on receipt of
federal funds must be clearly stated).  Because an implied cause of action relies on
an unstated intention on the part of Congress, it is completely incongruent with the
clear-statement requirement.  See also Key, supra note 3, at 294-302 (describing the
Supreme Court’s denial of implied causes of action under Spending Clause
programs, and the Court’s general retreat from recognizing any implied causes of
action).
45. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (holding that § 1983
encompasses violations of rights protected by any federal law, in the context of
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decide whether § 1983’s reference to federal “laws” applied only to
equal protection laws or to all federal laws.47  The plaintiffs had
alleged that the State of Maine and its Commissioner of Human
Services violated § 1983 by improperly calculating the amount of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children benefits to which they were
entitled under the federal Social Security Act.48  In granting judgment
for the plaintiffs, the Court ruled that § 1983 provided a cause of
action for the violation of rights protected by any federal law.49
The Court later placed limitations on the use of § 1983 to vindicate
federal rights.50  In Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing
Authority,51 it ruled that once a plaintiff established a § 1983 cause of
action, the defendant/state actor must demonstrate “by express
provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that
Congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement.”52  Such
evidence would be present if the statute provides its own
comprehensive enforcement scheme.53  The Wright Court further
held that a § 1983 action will not be permitted if the statute at issue
does not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within
the meaning of § 1983.54  In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n,55 the

Maine’s improperly calculating the plaintiff’s Aid to Families with Dependant
Children benefits); see also Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth.,
479 U.S. 418, 424-25, 429-30 (1987) (reasoning that the tenants of low-income
housing projects could use § 1983 to enforce their substantive rights created by the
Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act of 1937); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S.
498, 524 (1990) (ruling that health care providers may use § 1983 to enforce their
substantive rights created by the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act).
46. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
47. See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 3 (stating one issue presented by the case is “whether
§ 1983 encompasses claims based on purely statutory violations of federal law”).
48. See id. at 2-3.
49. See id. at 4 (relying on the plain language of § 1983 and the fact that Congress
attached no modifiers to the phrase “and laws”).
50. See Key, supra note 3, at 328-31 (describing the evolution of the Supreme
Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence).
51. 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
52. Id. at 423 (finding that Congress did not intend to foreclose a § 1983 action
when it passed the Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act of 1937).
53. See id. at 424 (holding that the remedial devices provided in the statute must
be sufficiently comprehensive to “demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the
remedy of suits under § 1983” (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l
Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981))).
54. See id. at 423.  In Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997), the Supreme
Court cited to Wright and Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990), in
establishing a three-prong test for determining whether a federal statute creates an
enforceable right within the meaning of § 1983:
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the
plaintiff.  Wright, 479 U.S. at 430.  Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so ‘vague and
amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.  Id. at
431-32.  Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation
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Supreme Court specifically applied these limitations to a § 1983 suit
brought to enforce provisions of the Boren Amendment56 to the
Medicaid Act.57  The Court ruled that Congress did not foreclose a
private judicial remedy for enforcement of the Medicaid Act under
§ 198358 and that the Amendment did create a federal right
enforceable by § 1983.59  The keen observer will note that the federal
rights at issue in Thiboutot, Wright, and Wilder were all granted by
federal legislation passed pursuant to Congress’ spending power.60
All of the plaintiffs in these cases, whom Judge Cleland would call
third-party beneficiaries of a contract, were recognized by the
Supreme Court as having causes of action under § 1983.
In Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,61 the Supreme Court specified
rules of construction for § 1983.62  In holding that a state is not a
“person” within the meaning of § 1983, the Court ruled that § 1983
should be construed in accordance with the common law as it existed
in 1871.63  The Court also ruled, in Will, that being subject to a § 1983
suit cannot be considered a condition placed on the receipt of

on the States. In other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right
must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.  Wilder, 496
U.S. at 510-11.
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340 (citations omitted).
55. 496 U.S. 498 (1989).
56. Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 962(a), 94 Stat. 2650 (1980).
57. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509.
58. See id. at 520-21 (concluding that because the federal statute did not expressly
preclude the use of § 1983 and because no other comprehensive remedial scheme
was created by the statute, the defendants could not demonstrate that Congress
intended to preclude the use of the § 1983 remedy).  While the court in Westside
Mothers never reached the issue of whether Congress intended to preclude to use of
§ 1983 to enforce the Medicaid Act, Wilder is direct authority for the proposition that
the State of Michigan would not be able to demonstrate such an intent.
59. See id. at 509-10 (holding that the Boren Amendment did create enforceable
rights in health care providers secured by § 1983 “to the adoption of reimbursement
rates that are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs of an efficiently and
economically operated facility that provides care to Medicaid patients”).
60. The federal statutes at issue in those cases, the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (now Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)), the
Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act of 1937, and the Boren Amendment to the
Medicaid Act, respectively, are all Spending Clause statutes.  See 42 U.S.C. § 601
(2001); 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994).
61. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
62. See id. at 65-66 (holding that a state is not a “person” within the meaning of
§ 1983).
63. See id. at 67 (“[I]n enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to override well-
established immunities or defenses under the common law.”).  Note, however, that
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment applied
to cases arising under federal law and brought by individuals against their own state),
was not decided until 1890, which undermines the Supreme Court’s assertion in Will
that § 1983, enacted in 1871, was meant to exclude suits brought against an actual
state by that state’s own citizens.
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federal funds.64
C. Sovereign Immunity and the Ex parte Young Doctrine
Sovereign immunity is the doctrine, embodied in the Eleventh
Amendment,65 that bars a citizen from suing a state without that
state’s consent.66  The Supreme Court’s sovereign immunity

64. See Will, 491 U.S. at 65 (“The language of § 1983 also falls far short of
satisfying the ordinary rule of statutory construction that if Congress intends to alter
the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,’ it
must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’”
(quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985))).  This
language was used by Judge Cleland in Westside Mothers as authority for the
proposition that § 1983 does not provide a cause of action for third-party
beneficiaries of a contract to enforce their rights.  See Westside Mothers v. Haveman,
133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 581 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
65. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.”); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-
73 (2000) (acknowledging that the precise text of the Eleventh Amendment is not as
important as the principle for which it stands); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669 (1999) (stating that the Eleventh
Amendment does much more than simply bar federal jurisdiction over suits brought
“against one State by citizens of another State or foreign state”).  In fact, since Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the Supreme Court has moved far beyond the actual
text of the Eleventh Amendment.  See infra note 66 (explaining the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment).  But see JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL
POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 76
(1987) (arguing that Hans should not be treated as an interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment but, rather, as an interpretation of Article III of the Constitution).
The Eleventh Amendment, ratified in 1795, was passed in response to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793) (holding that
Article III of the Constitution granted federal courts jurisdiction over the State of
Georgia in a suit by a private citizen from South Carolina).  See ORTH, supra note 65,
at 18-20 (recounting the background to and aftermath of Chisholm).  Congress was so
shocked by the Chisholm decision that it took less than two years to overturn it by
constitutional amendment.  See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,
325 (1934) (describing the response to Chisholm).  The purpose of the amendment
was to protect the states from being burdened by possible financial and property
claims resulting from the Revolutionary War.  See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-25, at 521 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the history of
the Eleventh Amendment).
66. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73 (confirming that the Constitution does not provide
for federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting states).  The Supreme Court
has taken the opportunity in its recent Eleventh Amendment cases to solidify the
sovereign immunity protection of the states.  See Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign
Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 4-5 (1999) (arguing that
the Court’s sovereign immunity decisions may be counterproductive because they
“may squander the Court’s political capital” and may encourage Congress to “subject
the states to more intrusive means of ensuring compliance with federal law”).  See,
e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that a non-consenting state cannot
be subjected to private suits under a federal cause of action in its own courts);
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (finding that the Commerce
Clause does not grant Congress the power to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity
in federal court (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1989)
(holding that Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause could abrogate the
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jurisprudence holds that a state does not waive its privilege of
sovereign immunity simply by accepting federal funds.67
Furthermore, the Court has held that no matter how explicitly it may
attempt to do so, Congress may not abrogate a state’s sovereign
immunity, except in the exercise of its powers to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment.68
However, with the Ex parte Young69 decision in 1908, the Court

Eleventh Amendment by including a clear statement of abrogation in the language
of the statute))).
Professor John C. Jeffries, Jr. confirms that “[a]s everyone knows, the Eleventh
Amendment is a mess.”  See John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and
Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 47 (1998) (arguing that despite the consistent self-
contradiction in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, the Eleventh Amendment
almost never matters functionally because Ex parte Young and § 1983 continue to
allow plaintiffs to effectively bring suit against states).  Although the prevailing
academic position maintains that the Eleventh Amendment only limits diversity
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court made clear more than 100 years ago, in Hans, 134
U.S. at 15, that the Eleventh Amendment also applies to federal-question cases and
to those cases brought by a state’s own citizens.  See Jeffries, supra note 66, at 48-49.
One of the most criticized of the Court’s sovereign immunity cases, Alden v. Maine,
relies on the theory that the states preexisted the Union and that they did not
relinquish their sovereign immunity upon adopting the constitutional plan.  See
Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1113, 1117 (2001) (arguing that Alden is flawed because it relies upon “myth”
rather than fact).  The disconnect between Alden and its holding in Chisholm ranks
among the many flaws of the Court’s Alden decision and of the preexisting states
theory.  See id. at 1147-48.  If state sovereign immunity existed at the time of the
Founding, then why is this not reflected in the Chisholm case of 1793, and why would
there be a need for the Eleventh Amendment to begin with?  See id.  These are just
some of the many contradictions that permeate the Court’s sovereign immunity
jurisprudence.  See generally ORTH, supra note 65 (providing a comprehensive review
of the origins and interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment).
67. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (“[T]he mere receipt of federal funds cannot
establish that a state has consented to suit in federal court.” (quoting Atascadero, 473
U.S. at 246-47)).  This statement, as well as the Court’s Pennhurst I requirement of
unambiguously stated conditions, has put to rest the possibility of a “constructive” or
“implied” waiver of sovereign immunity.  See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 676
(criticizing the acceptance of implied waivers in and overruling Parden v. Terminal
R. of Ala. Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184 (1964)).
68. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment and the principle of state sovereignty are limited by the enforcement
provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).  Congress’ limited power to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment was reaffirmed in Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59
(holding that Congress may not abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity using its
power under the Commerce Clause).  Fitzpatrick and Seminole Tribe relied on a
chronological theory, arguing that because the Eleventh Amendment preceded the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth empowers Congress to abrogate the
Eleventh.  See Weinberg, supra note 66, at 1128-29 (summarizing the chronological
argument).  If, however, Alden is correct in that the states’ sovereign immunity
preceded the U.S. Constitution, then a similar argument can be made that Article I
of the Constitution altered that immunity, allowing abrogation through use of the
Commerce Power.  See id. (discussing Justice Brennan’s use of this argument in Union
Gas, 491 U.S. at 18-19).
69. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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crafted a remedy for relief against illegal state action.70  The Ex parte
Young doctrine, in conjunction with § 1983, allows Medicaid
recipients to enforce their right to Medicaid benefits and avoid the
obstacle of sovereign immunity.71
Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, a suit against a state officer for
prospective injunctive relief to vindicate a federal law is not
considered a suit against that state for purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment.72  The rationale for this exception to state sovereign
immunity is that, as a constitutional matter, no state may violate or
cause its officials to violate a superior federal law.73  Any state official,
therefore, who does violate a superior federal law, acts beyond the
scope of the state’s authority and in doing so exposes himself to suit,
irrespective of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.74

70. See ORTH, supra note 65, at 128-34 (analyzing the Ex parte Young decision).
71. See Jeffries, supra note 66, at 59 (describing how Ex parte Young routinely
allows civil rights plaintiffs to evade the Eleventh Amendment when they seek
injunctive relief).
72. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 158-60 (explaining how granting injunctive
relief for the unconstitutional actions of a state officer does not affect the state “in its
sovereign or governmental capacity”); Robert P. Capistrano, Enforcing Federal Rights:
The Law of Section 1983 (Part I), 33 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 217, 235 (1999)
(“[B]eginning with Ex parte Young, federal courts have . . . permitted plaintiffs to get
around the Eleventh Amendment by seeking injunctive relief against the individual
heading the state agency . . . .”).
73. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157 (distinguishing between seeking an
injunction against a state official for his individual unconstitutional actions and suing
to enjoin the state official as a representative of the state, which is protected by
sovereign immunity).
74. See id. at 159-60 (explaining that a state official’s unconstitutional act strips
him of “his official or representative character” and renders him a private individual,
thereby precluding the state from affording him any immunity).  The Ex parte Young
doctrine rests on a legal fiction that the sovereign state cannot perform an act that is
unconstitutional.  Therefore, if one of the state’s officers is alleged to have
committed an unconstitutional act, that officer could not have done so with the
authority of the state.  See Eridania Perez-Jaquez, Note, Constitutionalizing State
Sovereign Immunity: Ex Parte Young and the Conservative Wing’s Attempt to Restore
Federalism and Empower States, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 229, 244-45 (1998) (explaining the
Ex parte Young rationale and criticizing the Supreme Court for shifting the balance of
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence in favor of the states).  Rather, that state officer
committing the unconstitutional act is “stripped” of his status as a representative of
the state.  See id. at 245.  He is said to be acting “ultra vires,” or “beyond the powers”
conferred upon him.  See id. at 230-31.  Thus, the suit against the officer is not
regarded as a suit against the state and, therefore, is not barred by sovereign
immunity.  See id. at 245.  The Ex parte Young Court limited the remedy available for
redress of such an act to an injunction against the officer.  See Young, 209 U.S. at 150
(noting the availability of equitable relief in federal courts to enjoin state officials
from violating constitutional law); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the
Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
495, 511 (1997) (describing the rationale of Ex parte Young and criticizing the
limitations the Supreme Court placed on the doctrine in Seminole Tribe); ORTH, supra
note 65, at 128-34 (recounting the history and rationale of Ex parte Young).  Professor
Orth acknowledges that Ex parte Young received heavy academic criticism in 1908
because of its status as a legal fiction.  See id. at 131.  However, the decision was
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Over the years, the Supreme Court has refined its conception of
this doctrine.  For example, in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman,75 the Supreme Court ruled that Ex parte Young may not be
used to obtain prospective injunctive relief against a state officer for
violation of a state law.76  In doing this, the Court redefined the
purpose of the doctrine in terms of the need to balance the
Supremacy Clause against the Eleventh Amendment and to ensure
the supremacy of federal law.77  In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,78
the Court placed a further limitation on the ability of plaintiffs to
obtain relief for the action of state officers.79  If the federal statute
being sued upon contains detailed remedial provisions, such
provisions can be taken as evidence that Congress did not want the Ex
parte Young remedy to be available.80  As will be noted in the next

tolerated, according to Professor Orth, because it was crucial to the establishment of
“constitutional government and the rule of law.”  Id. (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, 292 (4th ed. 1983)).
The Ex parte Young doctrine has been widely considered to counterbalance the
harsh rule of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).  See Perez-Jaquez, supra note
74, at 230.  While Hans holds that states are immune from suits brought in federal
court by their own citizens, Ex parte Young functionally allows such suits, as long as
they are crafted to perpetuate the legal “ultra vires” fiction.  See id. at 230-31.
75. 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (“Pennhurst II”).
76. Id. at 105 (holding that the purpose of the Ex parte Young remedy is to
vindicate the “supreme authority of federal law”).  The Pennhurst II Court claimed
that it would be an intrusion upon a state’s sovereignty for a federal court to instruct
state officials how to comply with state law.  See id.  Such federal action, the Court
stated, would violate the very “principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh
Amendment.”  Id.
77. See id. at 105 (holding that while the Ex parte Young doctrine exists to
vindicate the supremacy of federal law, that purpose must be weighed against the
need to ensure the sovereign immunity of the states).  The Pennhurst II Court
concluded that an alleged violation of state law is inconsequential to this balance and
would not, therefore, be covered by the Ex parte Young doctrine.  Id.  See also Jackson,
supra note 74, at 512 (recounting the Supreme Court’s “modern retrenchment” from
the Ex parte Young doctrine).
78. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
79. See id. at 74 (“[W]here Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme
for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should
hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state
officer based upon Ex parte Young.”); see also Jackson, supra note 74, at 513-14
(arguing that the Court’s reasoning in Seminole Tribe was flawed—first, because of the
unsupported conclusion that an Ex parte Young action was more burdensome than an
action available under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, and second, because the
Court improperly claimed that it could not determine whether Congress would have
intended an Ex parte Young action be available if it could not authorize an action
against the state itself).
80. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74 (noting that the courts should not permit
actions against state officials based on Ex parte Young where Congress has provided a
remedial scheme for the enforcement against a state of a statutorily created right).
This rationale appears to be very similar to the Court’s test for determining whether
Congress intended a § 1983 suit to be available.  Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496
U.S. 498 (1990), therefore, suggests that Seminole Tribe’s limitation on the Ex parte
Young remedy is not a problem for the Medicaid enforcement suit.  Consequently,
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section, the Court’s limitations on the Ex parte Young doctrine have
been used recently, in Westside Mothers, to deprive Medicaid recipients
of the use of this remedy.81
D. Westside Mothers v. Haveman and the Argument in Favor of
Eliminating the Medicaid Enforceability Suit
Westside Mothers v. Haveman was crafted to fall under the Ex parte
Young exception to sovereign immunity.82  The case began as the
typical private enforcement suit under § 1983.83  In a class action suit,
the plaintiffs, who were parents seeking Medicaid services for their
children, sued several Michigan officials, alleging that Michigan had
failed to provide to their eligible children Early and Periodic
Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment Services (“EPSDT services”)—a
required feature of Michigan’s Medicaid plan under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a).84  The plaintiffs sought prospective injunctive relief from
a federal court against the officials responsible for administering
Michigan’s Medicaid program.85  The purpose of the suit was to force
the Michigan officials to comply with the obligations required by the
Medicaid Act and undertaken by Michigan in its state Medicaid
plan.86  Although this type of suit has been brought hundreds of times
in the federal courts, Westside Mothers is now the first case to hold that
these suits can no longer get into court—using the Supreme Court’s
federalism jurisprudence to hold that Ex parte Young and § 1983 no
longer provide a viable means to obtain relief.87

Judge Cleland’s ruling that the Seminole Tribe limitation applies to the Medicaid Act is
highly questionable.  See Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 574
(E.D. Mich. 2001).
81. See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
82. See Pear, supra note 6, at A18 (describing the suit).
83. Id.
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1994) (“A State plan for medical assistance
must provide for making medical assistance available, including at least the care and
services listed in paragraphs (1) through (5), (17) and (21) of section 1396d(a) of
this title.”); 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(B) (1994) (“The term ‘medical assistance’
means payment of part or all of the cost of the following care and services . . . for
individuals . . . whose income and resources are insufficient to meet all of such cost—
early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services (as defined in
subsection (r) of this section) . . . .”); Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
85. See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
86. See id.
87. See Pear, supra note 6 (quoting concerns that the decision “makes Medicaid
unenforceable by private individuals”).
Westside Mothers is especially problematic for Medicaid recipients because it bars
such suits on the two separate grounds of sovereign immunity and no cause of
action.  Both prongs of Westside Mothers must be dealt with in order for Medicaid
recipients to get back into court.  However, this is not as troubling as it seems.  As will
be seen in Part II.A, both prongs rely on the premise that the Medicaid Act is not
equal to other federal laws, but rather is a creature of contract.
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Relying upon the Supreme Court’s holdings in the Pennhurst  cases
and Alden v. Maine,88 Judge Cleland held that legislation passed under
Congress’ spending power is not supreme federal law covered by the
Supremacy Clause.89  This argument, also advocated by Professor
David E. Engdahl,90 rests on the Supreme Court’s statement that
Spending Clause legislation is in the “nature of a contract.”91  The
federal government, according to Judge Cleland, lacks the
enumerated power to compel the states to participate in the
Medicaid program.92  Rather, Congress relies on its power of the
purse to seek participation from the states, and such participation is
completely voluntary.93  As the Supreme Court ruled in Pennhurst I,

It should also be noted that many of the federalism arguments made on behalf of
the State of Michigan and later adopted by Judge Cleland in Westside Mothers were
briefed by amicus participant, Jeffery Sutton, whose nomination by President George
W. Bush to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals is currently pending in the U.S.
Senate.  See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 552 n.3 (commending the helpfulness
of Mr. Sutton, whose participation was at Judge Cleland’s own request); see also Neil
A. Lewis, Bush Appeals For Peace on His Picks For the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at
A29 (naming Mr. Sutton as one of President George W. Bush’s nominees to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals); U.S. Dep’t of Just., Office of Legal Pol’y, Nominations, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/nominations.htm (last updated Dec. 21, 2001) (tracking
the status of Mr. Sutton’s nomination).
88. 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress may not subject a state to suit in
the state’s own courts without its consent).
89. See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 562.  For three additional rulings made
by Judge Cleland with respect to Ex parte Young, see supra note 27.
90. See Engdahl, supra note 30, at 62-63 (arguing that because conditions placed
in Spending Clause legislation are secured by contract alone, such legislation does
not fall under the Supremacy Clause).
91. See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 557, 561.  The Supreme Court’s
analogy was made in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981) (“Pennhurst I”).  See supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining the
basis for the Supreme Court’s analogy).
92. See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 561.
93. See id. at 561-62.  But see Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist
Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195, 212 (2001) (arguing that the greatest threat to the
states’ autonomy is Congress’ spending power).  According to Professor Baker, states
that find federal funding conditions unattractive, yet do not wish to forego federal
funds, are severely constrained in their decision-making.  See id.  This is because the
state has no alternative sources of revenue, and there is “no competitor to the federal
government” to which the state might turn as an alternative contract-partner.  See id.
However, Professor Celestine Richards McConville takes a different view.  See
Celestine Richards McConville, Federal Funding Conditions: Bursting Through the Dole
Loopholes, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 163, 173 (2001) (arguing that the presence or absence of
coercion should not turn on the amount of federal funding at stake).  According to
Professor McConville, a state is not the subject of coercion simply because the federal
government offers such a large sum of money that the state is incapable of rejecting
the funding condition.  See id.  Rather, she states, coercion involves the state’s ability
to make decisions as a sovereign.  See id.  Coercion would exist, according to
Professor McConville, where a state “cannot, by reason of the federal action, respond
to and implement the will of its people, and the people of that state cannot hold its
representatives accountable for the decision.”  Id.  Under this rationale, the state’s
level of temptation is not a factor in determining whether that state’s decision to
enter into a contract with the federal government is voluntary.  See id.
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Congress’ power to legislate under the Spending Clause rests on
whether the state knowingly and voluntarily accepts the terms of the
contract.94  If Congress could force participation upon the states,
Judge Cleland says, there would be no need for the Supreme Court to
require acceptance to be knowingly voluntary.95  Judge Cleland argues
that, because Congress cannot force the states to participate in the
Medicaid program, the Medicaid Act is not supreme federal law.96
This position initially presented a problem for Judge Cleland
because the Supreme Court has always held that Spending Clause
legislation falls under the power of the Supremacy Clause.97  Judge
Cleland avoided this problem by claiming that the Court has, in
recent years, “conducted a more searching analysis of the nature and
extent of the Supremacy Clause.”98  He cited Alden for the proposition
that “the Supremacy Clause enshrines as ‘the supreme Law of the
Land’ only those federal acts that comport with the constitutional
design.  Appeal to the Supremacy Clause alone merely raises the
question of whether a law is a valid exercise of the national power.”99

94. See Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 17 (“The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate
under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly
accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”); Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 561.
95. See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 558.
96. See id. at 562.  As explained by Professor Engdahl,
What makes such conditions obligatory is that essence as contract, wholly
apart from the circumstance that they happen to be spelled out in a statute
or an agency rule.  Although articulated in a statute or rule, they have no
force as ‘law’; their only force is contractual. Consequently, they are not
among the ‘Laws of the United States . . . made in Pursuance’ of the
Constitution, to which the Supremacy Clause applies.
Engdahl, supra note 30, at 71.
97. See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 561.  See, e.g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S.
132, 138 (1982) (invalidating under the Supremacy Clause certain provisions of New
York state law that conflict with federal regulations promulgated under the federal
AFDC program); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 600, 604 (1972) (finding a
California welfare regulation invalid under the Supremacy Clause because it
conflicted with AFDC provisions of Social Security Act); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S.
282, 285-86 (1971) (holding an Illinois statute conflicting with AFDC provisions of
the Social Security Act invalid under the Supremacy Clause).  Note that the Supreme
Court decided Blum one year after Pennhurst I, which undermines any argument that
Pennhurst I is a declaration by the Court that Spending Clause legislation does not fall
under the Supremacy Clause.
98. Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 561.
99. Id. (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 731 (1999)).  The Alden court held
that Congress could not subject a state to suit in state court without its consent.
Judge Cleland also relied on a federal district court decision, Brogdon v. Nat’l
Healthcare Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 2000), which held that the
Supremacy Clause does not apply to the Medicaid Act.  Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp.
2d at 561.  The use of Brogdon as support for this contention, however, should be
tempered by the fact that Brogdon relied exclusively on Pennhurst I.  See Brogdon, 103
F. Supp. 2d at 1339-42.  As explained above, Pennhurst I cannot possibly be used as
authority to support the argument that the Supremacy Clause does not apply to the
Medicaid Act because the Supreme Court subsequently ruled in Blum that the Social
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Accordingly, Judge Cleland ruled that the Supremacy Clause “does
not operate upon a State or its officers when Congress enacts a

Security Act was supreme federal law.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
Note also that several federal district courts have recently rejected the arguments
made by Judge Cleland in Westside Mothers.  In Boudreau v. Ryan, 2001 WL 840583
(N.D. Ill. May 1, 2001), Judge John Grady refused to accept the notion that
legislation passed pursuant to the Spending Clause is of “inferior dignity to other
laws.”  Id. at *5.  Judge Grady also declined to “depart from the long line of cases
allowing plaintiffs to use § 1983 to enforce rights under federal Spending Clause
statutes.”  Id. at *7.  Following Boudreau’s lead nearly six months later, federal district
court Judge Joan Lefkow, in Memisovski v. Patla, 2001 WL 1249615, *5 n.8 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 17, 2001), also rejected Westside Mothers as “unpersuasive and inconsistent with
other settled law.”
In Antrican v. Buell, 158 F. Supp. 2d 663, 669 n.5 (E.D.N.C. 2001), the Westside
Mothers argument was dismissed in a footnote stating: “Defendants argue that
plaintiffs, as third party beneficiaries of the Medicaid Act, may not seek enforcement
under section 1983.  Defendants’ argument is without merit, and the court does not
discuss it in detail.”  The federal district of New Hampshire has also declined to
follow the rationale of Westside Mothers, noting that, while it is of interest, Westside
Mothers “is, of course, not the law of the First Circuit.”  See Bryson v. Shumway, 2001
WL 1326578, *7 (D.N.H. Oct. 23, 2001) (ruling that a suit brought against state
officials for prospective injunctive relief that alleges violation of the Medicaid Act is
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
Another notable development occurred in Markva v. Haveman, 168 F. Supp. 2d
695 (E.D. Mich. 2001), where the State of Michigan declined to raise arguments it
had successfully used in Westside Mothers.  In Markva, a case virtually identical to
Westside Mothers, a class of Medicaid recipients and potential Medicaid recipients
brought a § 1983 action against Michigan state officials, alleging that the state’s
refusal to allow them to exclude certain household income in determining eligibility
was a violation of the Medicaid Act.  See id. at 699.  In Judge David Lawson’s order
granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, he noted the defendants had
“disavowed reliance on any grounds for relief stated in [Westside Mothers], but reserve
the right to reassert those grounds if Westside Mothers holds up on appeal.”  Id. at 704.
The Markva case was cited by the federal district court of Maine in its most recent
rejection of the Westside Mothers rationale.  See Rancourt v. Concannon, 2001 WL
1505421, *1 (D. Me. Nov. 28, 2001) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss a § 1983
suit against Maine state official alleging violation of the Medicaid Act’s requirement
that covered medical assistance be furnished with reasonable promptness to all
eligible individuals).
In addition to the preceding decisions, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
recently held that sovereign immunity does not bar a § 1983 suit to enforce a plaintiff
Medicaid recipient’s federal right to reasonably prompt waiver services pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8).  See Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Health, 261 F.3d 970, 975-77
(10th Cir. 2001).  The court in Lewis affirmed the use of Ex parte Young to seek
prospective injunctive relief against the Governor of New Mexico and the state’s
Secretary of Health.  See id.  Of particular significance, the court’s opinion made no
mention of the Westside Mothers decision, even though the defendants specifically
brought Westside Mothers to the court’s attention.  See National Senior Citizens Law
Center, Medicaid Act Enforceable Under Ex Parte Young, at http://www.nsclc.org/
lewis082701.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2002) (reporting that the Tenth Circuit, in Lewis,
applied the Ex parte Young doctrine in a manner that led to a holding contradictory
to Westside Mothers, even though the defendants brought Westside Mothers to the
attention of the court).
As Westside Mothers makes its way through the Sixth Circuit, the foregoing decisions
increase the likelihood of a circuit-split and a trip to the U.S. Supreme Court.  This
case would be a perfect vehicle for the Court to build upon an agenda already
recognized as hostile to entitlements.  See supra note 28 (describing the Court’s “New
Federalism”).
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program such as Medicaid . . . because neither the Spending Power
nor any other Article I power grants Congress the authority to
compel State action.”100  Consequently, the limitation placed on the
Ex parte Young doctrine in Pennhurst II becomes effective and the
doctrine can no longer be used to sue a state officer for prospective
injunctive relief from a violation of conditions placed on Spending
Clause programs.101  Accordingly, Westside Mothers held that the
sovereign immunity doctrine barred the suit.102
Judge Cleland further ruled that, even if a Medicaid enforcement
suit were not barred by sovereign immunity, § 1983 provides no cause
of action for Medicaid recipients to vindicate their federal right.103
For this argument, Judge Cleland relied on Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion in Blessing v. Freestone.104  In Blessing, Justice Scalia
contended that Medicaid recipients are essentially third-party
beneficiaries to the contracts between the states and the federal
governments.105  Justice Scalia specifically left open the possibility that
third-party beneficiaries could not, under § 1983, sue for violation of

100. Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
101. See id. at 561.  Note, however, that the Supreme Court in Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (“Pennhurst II”) did not contemplate a
distinction between supreme and non-supreme federal law.  At the time, it simply
recognized the distinction between state and federal law and ruled that Ex parte
Young should not be available to remedy violations of state law.  See id. at 106.
Pennhurst II should therefore be of questionable value for the proposition that Ex
parte Young also is not available for non-supreme federal law.  As will be seen in Part
II.B.1, the Ex parte Young remedy also seems applicable when the sovereign has
assured the federal government that it will comply with the Medicaid Act, even if the
Medicaid Act is not supreme federal law.
102. See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
103. See id. at 576; see also Engdahl, supra note 30, at 104-05 (arguing that even
though conditions placed on receipt of federal funds are prescribed in a federal
statute, the conditions do not become binding upon a state until the state agrees to
accept federal funds).  According to Professor Engdahl, the entitlements of
beneficiaries of these Spending Clause programs do not exist until the agreement is
made.  See id.  Hence, Engdahl argues these third-party rights are “secured” not by
the federal statute, but “only by contract.”  See id.  Engdahl ultimately uses this
premise to conclude that § 1983 should not be allowed as a cause of action to
enforce third-party rights because it was never meant to remedy contract violations.
See id.
104. See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 577; see also Blessing v. Freestone, 520
U.S. 329 (1997) (holding that Title IV-D of Social Security Act did not create any
federal rights, privileges, or immunities enforceable using § 1983).
105. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring).
The State promises to provide certain services to private individuals, in
exchange for which the Federal Government promises to give the State
funds.  In contract law, when such an arrangement is made (A promises to
pay B money, in exchange for which B promises to provide services to C),
the person who receives the benefit of the exchange of promises between
the two others (C) is called a third-party beneficiary.
Id.
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their contract rights.106  Judge Cleland, however, decided the issue
despite having ruled that sovereign immunity barred the suit.107  He
used the Supreme Court’s holding in Will for the proposition that
§ 1983 must be construed in accordance with the common law as it
existed in 1871.  Judge Cleland then made a finding of fact that, in
1871, third-party beneficiaries lacked common law rights to sue
under a contract.108  Accordingly, Judge Cleland ruled that § 1983 did
not independently create a cause of action for Medicaid recipients to
enforce their right to Medicaid EPSDT services.109
Judge Cleland’s conclusion, however, is logically flawed.
Irrespective of whether or not a third-party beneficiary right to sue
actually existed in 1871, the Supreme Court has clearly recognized,
for the past twenty years, that § 1983 may be used by Medicaid
recipients to enforce their right to services.110 Each year, the State of
Michigan accepts federal Medicaid funds with this unambiguously
clear statement from the Court that § 1983 includes a cause of action
for Medicaid recipients.  There can be no doubt that this satisfies the
Pennhurst I clear-statement test.  The only difference here is this clear
statement comes from the Court instead of Congress.111  Congress,

106. See id. at 350 (acknowledging that the third-party beneficiary issue was not
raised by the parties and not necessary for resolution of the case, therefore leaving
the issue open, but pointing out that allowing the use of § 1983 to vindicate third-
party beneficiary rights would be a vast expansion of § 1983).
107. See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 575.
108. See id. at 579-81 (citing Second Nat’l Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U.S. 123, 124
(1878)) (recognizing “the general rule that privity of contract is required” to support
an action to enforce a contract); C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
79 (2d ed. 1880) (noting that in the 1870s, the recognized rule was “that a person for
whose benefit a promise was made, if not related to the promisee, could not sue
upon the promise”); 1 W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 509 (M.
Bigelow ed., 1874) (noting “the tendency of the [American] courts” to hold that “no
stranger to the consideration can take advantage of a contract, though made for his
benefit”); K. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT
230 (1990) (explaining that “the rights of donee beneficiaries were not clearly
established until Seaver v. Ransom (1918)”).  Judge Cleland also rejected the
plaintiffs’ reliance on both Corbin’s and Williston’s support for third-party
beneficiary actions, noting that both had actually “acknowledged that the common
law right of donee beneficiaries to sue was a 20th Century development that altered
the previous state of affairs.”  Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 580-81.  Judge
Cleland ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs failed to proffer any persuasive
historical evidence that third-party beneficiaries had a right to sue in 1871.  See id. at
581.
109. See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 581.  Judge Cleland further ruled that
the most charitable view of the state of the law in 1871 is that the existence of third-
party beneficiary rights was ambiguous.  If that were the case, he states, it would still
fall short of the clear statement necessary to impose a condition upon the receipt of
federal funds.  See id.
110. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
111. Despite the logic of this argument, the ability to place conditions upon the
receipt of federal funds rests in Congress’ exercise of the spending power, not in the
hands of the judiciary.  See Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 17 (recognizing the power of
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meanwhile, has been conspicuously silent in the face of twenty years
of § 1983 private enforcement, never expressing an intention to limit
such litigation.112
II. ANALYSIS
A. Applying Classic Contract Theory to Spending Clause Legislation
Reaffirms the Legality of Medicaid Enforceability Suits
The Westside Mothers decision is flawed because it relies too heavily
upon the vague concept that Medicaid legislation is in the nature of a
contract.113  The contract analogy has been sufficient for the Supreme
Court to resolve whether certain conditions placed upon the receipt
of federal funds have been made clear,114 whether such conditions are
enforceable against third-party obligees,115 or whether they are
coercive.116  However, Westside Mothers goes further than mere analogy
and states that “[i]n short, the Medicaid program is a contract
between Michigan and the Federal Government, and Medicaid
recipients are third-party beneficiaries of that contract.”117  Judge

Congress to enact federal funding conditions).
112. But see 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 (1994).  After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in
Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) that a certain provision of the Social Security
Act could not be enforced using § 1983, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2, which
states in part:
In an action brought to enforce a provision of this chapter, such provision is
not to be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section of this
chapter requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a State
plan. This section is not intended to limit or expand the grounds for
determining the availability of private actions to enforce State plan
requirements other than by overturning any such grounds applied in Suter v.
Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992), but not applied in prior Supreme Court
decisions respecting such enforceability . . . .
This enactment demonstrates, at least in the case of Artist M., that Congress will
clarify itself when it believes the Court has misconstrued congressional intent to
allow private enforcement of a federal right using § 1983.
113. See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 557 (“Unlike legislation enacted under
§ 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment], however, legislation enacted pursuant to the
spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the
states agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.” (quoting Pennhurst I, 451
U.S. at 17)).
114. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (“[I]f Congress desires to
condition the States’ receipt of federal funds, it ‘must do so unambiguously . . . .’”
(quoting Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 17)).
115. See U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 606
(1986) (holding that the scope of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is
limited to those who actually receive federal financial assistance).
116. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (“Our decisions have recognized that in some
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as
to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’” (quoting Steward Mach.
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937))).
117. Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 557 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
PLATTPP.DOC 1/31/2002  11:46 AM
298 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:273
Cleland made this statement without actually performing a detailed
contract analysis of the Medicaid program.  In doing so, he
discounted the fact that the State of Michigan may have violated the
Medicaid law, and instead found that Michigan’s actions (or more
appropriately, inactions) merely constituted a breach of contract.118
Judge Cleland essentially failed to distinguish between the Medicaid
law and the federal-state contract.  When the Medicaid program is
properly subjected to contract analysis, however, the contract and the
law are seen to operate as two separate mechanisms.
These two mechanisms become apparent when the Medicaid
program is explained, as it is in Part I.A of this Comment, as a grant
of federal funds to a state in return for that state’s submission of a
Medicaid plan that conforms to the requirements of the Medicaid
Act.  The first mechanism is the federal Medicaid Act itself.  The
second is the state Medicaid plan.  In terms of contract law, the state
Medicaid plan should be viewed as the embodiment of the contract
because it sets forth the terms of the bargain between the state and
federal governments.119  The Medicaid Act, on the other hand, should
be seen as the governing law of the contract because it establishes
how the contract will be formed and administered.120
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that a contract
requires “a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent
to the exchange and a consideration.”121  Furthermore, “[t]he
manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange ordinarily takes the
form of an offer or proposal by one party followed by an acceptance
by the other party or parties.”122  Given this framework, it seems clear

(emphasis added).
118. See id. at 587-88.  The plaintiffs in Westside Mothers fell into the same confused
analysis of the Medicaid program.  See id. at 558.  The plaintiffs’ brief claimed that
the fact that the Medicaid program is “much in the nature of a contract” suggests it is
also in the nature of “something else” as well.  See id.  That “something else,” claimed
the plaintiffs, is that the statute in question is a “law,” not just a contract.  See id.  This
argument, however, suffers from the same weakness as Judge Cleland’s argument
because it also confuses the state Medicaid plan with the federal Medicaid law.  The
plaintiffs’ argument is essentially the reverse of Judge Cleland’s—discounting the
breach of contract and focusing instead upon Michigan’s actions as a violation of the
law.
119. See infra note 124 (describing the comprehensive nature of a state Medicaid
plan).
120. See Brad S. Karp, The Litigation Angle in Drafting Commercial Contracts, 1219 PLI
CORP. LAW & PRAC. 487, 505-11 (2000) (“Most parties to a contract . . . designate a
particular state’s law to govern disputes that arise out of the contractual
relationship.”).  An example of such a clause is given as: “This Agreement shall be
construed, and the obligations, rights and remedies of the parties hereunder shall be
determined, in accordance with the laws of the State of New York.”  Id. at 533.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22 (1981).
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that the submission of a state Medicaid plan serves as a state’s offer to
form a contract with the federal government.123  The contents of such
an offer are dictated by the federal Medicaid Act.124  The Medicaid
Act, therefore, can be seen as, among other things, an invitation to
make an offer—an advertisement to each state that there are federal
grants to be had for any state willing to operate a Medicaid program
under the specific terms listed in the Act.125
When a state does submit a state Medicaid plan to the U.S.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary must decide
whether or not to accept the state’s offer.126  The Secretary’s actions
are also governed by the Medicaid Act.127  The Secretary may only
accept a plan if it meets the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a).128
If the plan does not meet the statutory requirements, then the
Secretary may reject the offer and ask for the submission of a plan
that conforms to the requirements of the law.129  When satisfied with
the state plan, the Secretary will accept the offer with a grant of

123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981) (“An offer is the
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another
person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude
it.”).  The submission of a state Medicaid plan is the first step a state must take to
obtain federal Medicaid funds.  If the operation of a Medicaid program is indeed the
result of a contract between the state and Federal government, then we can say that,
by submitting a plan, the state has expressed its willingness to enter into that
contract.  Furthermore, because the Secretary (or the offeree) knows, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(b), that his assent to the plan is all that is needed to create the
contract, the state Medicaid plan must be deemed an offer.
124. See 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (2000) (“The State plan contains all information
necessary for [the Secretary] to determine whether the plan can be approved to
serve as a basis for Federal financial participation (FFP) in the State program.”).  The
specific provisions the state Medicaid plan must include are contained in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a).  These two sources of law reinforce the argument that the submission of
a plan is an offer.  By law, the plan is drafted such that once it is submitted, the only
options open to the Secretary are either to accept the plan and thereby create a
contract, or to reject the plan and invite an alternative offer from the state.
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (1994) (“The Secretary shall approve any plan which
fulfills the conditions specified in subsection (a) [of this section].”); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. d (1981) (“Invitation of bids or other
offers.  Even though terms are specified in detail, it is common for one party to
request the other to make an offer.”).
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b).  The Secretary’s acceptance is conditioned upon
the state’s Medicaid plan meeting the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a).  See id.
127. See id.  Such limits further support the contention that the federal Medicaid
law serves as the “governing law” of the contract.  See supra note 120 (describing a
“governing law” clause).  The law dictates the content of the offer and whether the
Secretary may accept that offer and enter into a contract with the state.
Furthermore, as will be seen in infra notes 132-135 and accompanying text, the
Medicaid law also dictates the administration of the Medicaid program throughout
the term of the contract.
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b).
129. The logical implication of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) is that the Secretary is
empowered to reject any state Medicaid plan that fails to comport with 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a).
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federal funds.130  On acceptance, mutual assent has been achieved
and a contract comes into existence, the specific terms of which are
memorialized in the state’s Medicaid plan, which forms an
“integrated agreement” in terms of contract law.131
The federal Medicaid regulations mandate that every state
Medicaid plan must also contain an assurance that the state’s
Medicaid program “will be administered in conformity with the
specific requirements of [the Medicaid Act], the regulations
[promulgated under the Act], and other applicable official issuances
of the Department [of Health and Human Services].”132  In contract
law, this assurance has been referred to as a “compliance with law”
clause.133  This Comment argues that a state that gives this assurance
submits to be governed by the federal Medicaid Act, as administered
and interpreted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, and even as potentially amended by Congress.

130. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1396b.
131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 (1981) (“Manifestation of
mutual assent to an exchange requires that each party either make a promise or
begin or render a performance.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209
(1981) (“An integrated agreement is a writing or writings constituting a final
expression of one or more terms of an agreement.”); see also 42 C.F.R. § 430.10
(2000) (“The State plan is a comprehensive written statement submitted by the
[state] agency describing the nature and scope of its Medicaid program . . . .”).  In
terms of the Medicaid program, a contract is deemed to exist between the state and
federal governments because the state has exchanged a promise for a performance
on the part of the federal government.  The state’s Medicaid plan consists of all the
promises the state has made in order to receive federal Medicaid funds.  The federal
government’s grant of these funds is performance rendered to secure the state’s
performance of the promises made in its state plan.  Because the state Medicaid plan
is the final expression of the bargain struck, the plan is considered the integrated
agreement.  As is noted in Part II.B, it is important to view this integrated agreement
as an instrument distinct from the Medicaid Act, which actually prescribes the
promises the state must make in its Medicaid plan.
132. 42 C.F.R. § 430.10.
133. See ROBERT A. FELDMAN & RAYMOND T. NIMMER, DRAFTING EFFECTIVE
CONTRACTS: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE § 5.10, Form 5-218 (2d ed. 2000) (“6.
Compliance with Law: You shall fully comply with all laws, ordinances, rules, and
regulations which are applicable to the performance of your services.”).  As Feldman
& Nimmer explain, a compliance with law clause is typically used in a contract for the
sale of goods to secure a pledge from the producer/seller of those goods that the
sold goods will be produced in compliance with federal labor laws.  See id. at 5-161.
Failure to adhere to these laws creates a risk for the purchaser because the purchaser
would then be unable to move those goods through interstate commerce.  See id.
The compliance with law clause allows the purchaser to claim these “hot goods” were
bought with a good faith knowledge that they met federal standards, and thereby
exempt the goods from the federal law.  See id.  The clause also allows the purchaser
to seek an indemnity from the producer/seller of “hot goods” if the purchaser incurs
liability for reselling them.  See Wallace v. Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 426 So. 2d 224
(La. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing the right of a gas distributor to seek an indemnity
against a gas manufacturer who warranted in a sales contract that the gas was
produced in full and complete compliance with law, but denying the indemnity on
public policy grounds).
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Placing contract labels upon the various components of the
Medicaid program indicates that the Supreme Court is incorrect in
classifying Medicaid legislation as “in the nature of a contract.”  It is
more suitable to say, in accordance with the description set out in this
section, that the contract is embodied in the state Medicaid plan.134
The Medicaid legislation, on the other hand, exists as a separate
mechanism, governing how that contract will be administered,
interpreted, and possibly altered.135  Westside Mothers fails to make this
distinction between the law and the contract.  The furthest Judge
Cleland would venture in this respect was to acknowledge that the
federal statute “authorized” the contract.136  Judge Cleland
concluded, however, that the Medicaid law was not “of equal force”
with other federal law.137  The next section of this Comment seeks to
dispel that notion.
B. Results of a Contract Analysis
The foregoing contract analysis has two implications for Westside
Mothers.  First, it makes clear that, in agreeing to implement a
Medicaid program, a state both enters into a contract with the federal
government and submits to being governed by the federal Medicaid
Act.138  A second implication of this contract analysis for Westside
Mothers is that when a state violates the provisions of its Medicaid
program, it not only breaches its contract with the federal
government, but more importantly, it violates a law that it undertook
to obey.139  This second implication naturally relies upon the
existence of the first and constitutes the most significant result of a
strict contract analysis.  By not conducting a proper contract analysis
in Westside Mothers, Judge Cleland overlooked this second implication
and its significance.  As this Comment’s analysis makes clear, the
State of Michigan violated supreme federal law when it failed to

134. See supra note 131 (describing the rationale for considering the state
Medicaid plan to be the embodiment of a contract).
135. See supra note 120.
136. See Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 558 (E.D. Mich.
2001).
137. Id.  As will be seen in Part II.B.1, the state’s assurance “gives life” to the
federal Medicaid law.
138. See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text (describing the two
mechanisms that operate within the Medicaid program).
139. See infra Part II.B.2.  As was noted in supra note 32, the Medicaid Act is
flexible enough that a state may violate the terms of its own Medicaid plan without
venturing so far contrary to the requirements of the Medicaid Act that it violates the
law.  This discussion, however, contemplates a Westside Mothers-type violation, such as
the failure to provide required EPSDT services to eligible children.
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provide Medicaid services to eligible recipients.140  Such a violation of
federal rights, irrespective of whether the violation of third-party
beneficiary rights is actionable, allows a § 1983 cause of action.141
1. The Medicaid Act becomes supreme federal law once a state submits to the
federal Medicaid laws
When a state submits to being governed by the federal Medicaid
Act, the novel argument can be made that what was once the non-
supreme federal Medicaid Act actually becomes supreme over that
state.  The assurance given by the state pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 430.10
(the “assurance”) must have this effect because its vast scope operates
as the functional equivalent of the Supremacy Clause.142
In 42 U.S.C. § 1396c, the Medicaid Act specifically authorizes the
Secretary to withhold federal funds if the state fails to comply with its
obligations.143  The state willingly consents to this arrangement when
it accepts federal funds.  The assurance, therefore, is not needed to
ensure the state’s compliance with the Medicaid law vis-à-vis the
federal government.144  But what then is the significance of the
additional step of requiring the state to assure the federal
government that it will comply with the federal Medicaid laws?
This Comment argues that the assurance brings the Medicaid Act
within the ambit of the Supremacy Clause.  The assurance is far more
powerful than the funds-cutoff provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1396c.  While
§ 1396c simply provides the federal government with a remedy for a
state’s failure to comply with the Medicaid Act, the assurance

140. See infra Part II.B.1 (arguing that the Medicaid Act becomes supreme federal
law once a state agrees to submit to the federal Medicaid laws).
141. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (finding that the Boren
Amendment did create certain federal rights enforceable through § 1983, without
any discussion of third-party beneficiary rights).
142. See 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (2000) (ensuring that state Medicaid programs will
conform with all requirements of Title XIX of the Social Security Act).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c provides:
If the Secretary . . . finds—(1) that the plan has been so changed that it no
longer complies with the provisions of section 1396a of this title; or (2) that
in the administration of the plan there is a failure to comply substantially
with any such provision; the Secretary shall notify such state agency that
further payments will not be made to the state (or, in his discretion, that
payments will be limited to categories under or parts of the state plan not
affected by such failure), until the Secretary is satisfied that there will no
longer be any such failure to comply.
144. If the funds-cutoff provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1396c already serves to ensure a
state’s compliance with the federal Medicaid Act, the assurance must serve a
different function.  Cf. Eleanor D. Kinney, Clearing the Way for an Effective Federal-State
Partnership in Health Reform, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 907 (1999) (identifying the
assurance as a mechanism that provides how the state will meet federal
requirements).
PLATTPP.DOC 1/31/2002  11:46 AM
2001] WESTSIDE MOTHERS 303
represents a state pledge to obey the federal Medicaid laws.  The
assurance includes obedience to all federal regulations promulgated
pursuant to the Medicaid Act by the Secretary.145  A state that gives the
assurance, therefore, subscribes to every interpretation of the Act
made by the Secretary.  Presumably, the state also agrees to obey any
amendment to the Medicaid Act itself, even one made during the
term of the state’s Medicaid contract with the federal government.
The federal government may, as a result, act unilaterally to alter the
Medicaid obligations of participating states.  The participating states
specifically have agreed to defer to such federal action.  This
displacement of state authority is precisely the function of the
Supremacy Clause, which ensures consistent state adherence to
federal law.146
Accordingly, a sovereign state that gives the assurance effectively
has consented to the supremacy of the federal Medicaid laws and has
voluntarily brought those laws within the ambit of the Supremacy
Clause.147  Once the Supremacy Clause operates upon the federal
Medicaid law, the Ex parte Young doctrine dictates that the state can
no longer bestow authority upon one of its officers to violate the
Medicaid Act.148  If a state officer does violate the provisions of the
federal law, then he will be individually liable.149  The Ex parte Young

145. See 42 C.F.R. § 430.10.
146. See TRIBE, supra note 65, § 6-28, at 1172 (“So long as Congress acts within an
area delegated to it, the preemption of conflicting state or local action . . . flow
directly from the substantive source of whatever power Congress is exercising,
coupled with the Supremacy Clause . . . .”).
147. This statement may actually depend upon certain conceptual issues
regarding the relationship between the sovereign states and the federal government.
Primarily, once a sovereign state assures the federal government that it will comply
with the federal law, is it theoretically possible for the sovereign to violate that
assurance?  This Comment takes the position that a state’s consent to defer to the
supremacy of the federal Medicaid law is much like the state’s consent to defer to the
supremacy of other federal laws when it adopted the constitutional plan itself.  The
difference between a state’s consent to the supremacy of federal law in the
Constitution and its consent to the supremacy of the federal Medicaid law appears to
be the extent to which the state has bound itself to that arrangement.  Unlike the
constitutional plan, a state can simply opt not to participate in the Medicaid program
and thereby release itself from the assurance.  However, once the sovereign state has
assented to such a relationship with the national government, it cannot empower
one of its officers to act in violation of the terms of that arrangement.
148. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (holding that a state is
powerless to direct a state officer to violate federal law).  The Supreme Court has
stated that the Ex parte Young remedy serves to ensure the supremacy of federal law.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.  If that is the case, Ex parte Young should be
just as applicable to federal laws that became supreme upon a state’s granting the
assurance as it is to federal laws that are supreme as a result of the state’s adoption of
the constitution plan.
149. Cf. id. (holding a state officer individually liable for violating a federal law
that was, at the time of enactment, covered by the Supremacy Clause).
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doctrine allows a plaintiff to overcome a state’s sovereign immunity
by focusing on this state officer’s individual liability for the
violation.150  Without the ability to apply this doctrine in the context
of a private Medicaid enforceability suit, the Medicaid Act will
effectively become unenforceable.151  However, adopting the rationale
set forth in this Comment would preserve such use of the Ex parte
Young doctrine and thus ensure the viability of the Medicaid
program.152
2. A violation of the Medicaid Act gives rise to a § 1983 cause of action
Judge Cleland correctly concluded that a state that fails to abide by
a provision of its Medicaid program breaches the terms of its state
plan—its contract with the federal government.153  As explained in
Part II.A of this Comment, the Medicaid program encompasses two
separate mechanisms, the contract and its governing law.154  Thus a
breach of the state plan also results in a violation of federal law.
Given the two mechanisms at work in the program, Medicaid
recipients enjoy third-party rights from the contract as well as distinct
federal entitlements.  While they are indeed third-party beneficiaries
to the contract, Medicaid recipients also are citizens to whom the
Medicaid Act provided enforceable rights to certain Medicaid
services.155  Although Judge Cleland states otherwise, the Medicaid Act

150. See supra Part I.C (describing the Ex parte Young doctrine and its rationale).
151. Cf. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (noting that Ex
parte Young is the primary avenue for an individual to obtain injunctive relief to
remedy a state officer’s ongoing violation of federal law).
152. Even if the Medicaid Act is ruled not to be supreme federal law, an argument
can be made that the Ex parte Young doctrine should still be available to remedy a
violation of non-supreme federal law when a state has given its assurance that it will
comply with that law.  See supra note 147 (analogizing the assurance to the states’
adoption of the constitutional plan).  Once the sovereign state assures the federal
government that it will comply with the Medicaid law, a mechanism is necessary to
ensure that state’s contract obligations.  The best mechanism available to achieve this
is Ex parte Young.  As noted in supra note 101, the Supreme Court in Pennhurst II
failed to address the applicability of Ex parte Young to non-supreme federal law, as the
concept did not yet exist.  It therefore remains viable to argue that Ex parte Young
should be available to ensure the integrity of a contract between the state and federal
government.
153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235(2) (1981) (“When
performance of a duty under a contract is due any non-performance is a breach.”).
A state’s failure to abide by a provision of its Medicaid plan would constitute a failure
to perform a duty under its contract with the federal government, and therefore, also
constitute a breach.
154. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text (arguing that, in addition to
the contract, the Medicaid Act functions as a separate mechanism governing the
performance of the contract).
155. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990) (holding that the
Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act created substantive federal rights
enforceable under § 1983).
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is not just an authorizing statute without force of its own.156  The
contract analysis instead makes clear that the federal law operates as a
separate mechanism, empowered by the state’s assurance that it will
abide by that law.157  When a state violates the Medicaid Act, it also
violates the federal rights of Medicaid recipients.158
Accordingly, Medicaid recipients theoretically should have two
causes of action available—one for breach of their contract right and
another for violation of their federal civil right.159  Even if that federal
civil right had not existed before the state entered into its agreement
with the federal government, it came into existence when the state
agreed to abide by the Medicaid Act.160  In effect the state assured the
federal government that, in administering its Medicaid program, it
would not violate Medicaid recipients’ federal right to certain
required services.161
As Westside Mothers suggests, § 1983 may not provide a cause of
action for breach of third-party beneficiary rights.  However, in
accordance with its original intention, § 1983 still offers protection
against the violation of federal rights under the color of state law.162

156. See Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 558 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(contemplating the Act’s contractual mechanism).
157. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the power of the assurance to secure state
compliance of federal Medicaid law).
158. Cf. Wilder, 496 U.S. 498, 509, 520 (1990) (holding that when the Boren
Amendment to the Medicaid Act was violated, the federal rights of health care
providers were violated).  The Court in Wilder held that the Boren Amendment
bestowed upon health care providers an enforceable right within the meaning of
§ 1983 to “reasonable and adequate” reimbursement rates.  Id. at 509.  Because that
right was violated under the color of state law, and because Congress did not intend
to foreclose private enforcement, the Court sustained the plaintiffs’ § 1983 suit.  See
id. at 520, 524.  Although the court in Westside Mothers never reached the issue of
whether the Medicaid Act created an enforceable right to EPSDT services within the
meaning of § 1983, at least one federal court has determined that such a right does
exist.  See Dajour B. v. City of New York, 2001 WL 830674, *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2001)
(“Under the Wilder/Blessing framework, it is clear that the EPSDT provisions provide
the plaintiffs with an enforceable right under Section 1983.”).
159. Until Westside Mothers, § 1983 was thought to provide for both causes of
action.  Conceptualizing a state’s failure to provide required Medicaid services as
giving rise to two separate causes of action is not unlike the many cases in which a
single act gives rise to both a contract and a tort action.
160. See supra Part II.B.1 (arguing that the Supremacy Clause would not operate
upon the Medicaid Act until the state gives its assurance that it will comply with that
Act).  This is because no citizen of a state can be eligible to receive Medicaid services
until that state agrees to administer a Medicaid program.
161. A state’s assurance that it will abide by the Medicaid Act is an implicit
assurance that the rights provided by that Act will not be violated.
162. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (ruling that § 1983 provides a
cause of action for the violation of rights protected by any federal law).
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C. Impact of Westside Mothers on Other State-Administered Federal
Entitlement Programs
The Medicaid Act is merely one of the many entitlement statutes
passed pursuant to Congress’ spending power that require state
administration and place certain conditions upon the receipt of
federal funds.  Other such federal-state cooperative programs provide
low-income people with food stamps,163 public housing,164 school
lunches,165 foster care,166 education for the disabled,167 and much
more.168
All of these federal entitlement programs parallel the Medicaid
program’s structure and are therefore subject to Judge Cleland’s
reasoning in Westside Mothers.169  Should Westside Mothers become the
Law of the Land, a state participating in any of the aforementioned
programs may freely violate the federal entitlement rights granted
under these programs without fear that these rights can be enforced
privately using § 1983.  When this is considered in conjunction with
the unfortunate fact that the federal government rarely exercises its
own power to enforce federal funding conditions placed on grant-in-
aid programs,170 it seems difficult to continue viewing these
conditions as enforceable obligations.  If private citizens cannot
enforce these conditions and the federal government is unwilling to
do so, then there are, practically speaking, no means to secure
compliance by a state.
Fortunately, however, many, if not all of the federal grant-in-aid
programs mentioned above require an assurance from each
participating state that it will comply with all applicable federal laws
and regulations.171  The arguments this Comment offers in support of

163. Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2030 (1994).
164. United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437x (1994).
165. National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1769 (1994).
166. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628,
670-679(a) (1994).
167. Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1994).
See generally Key, supra note 3, at 288 (recounting the various grant-in-aid programs
passed in the 1960s and 1970s).
168. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(listing thirteen grant-in-aid programs that could give rise to § 1983 actions).
169. See Key, supra note 3, at 288-89 (reviewing the common characteristics of
nearly all federal grant-in-aid programs—a transfer of federal funds to the states, the
filing of a state plan, designation of a state administrative entity, and federal power to
impose regulations and adopt minimum standards).
170. See id. at 292 (noting that the federal government’s power to withhold federal
funds is rarely, “if ever,” invoked).
171. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 3016.11 (2000) (requiring any state receiving federal
grant-in-aid funds through the U.S. Department of Agriculture to give an assurance
in its state plan that it will comply with all applicable federal laws and regulations).
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§ 1983, therefore, also apply to many of these programs and would
maintain the obligatory nature of federal funding conditions.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Westside Mothers v. Haveman has wide-ranging
implications.  As mentioned, Medicaid can no longer be considered
health insurance if Westside Mothers is upheld.172  This is especially
important given that 41.4 million people, or twelve percent of the
entire U.S. population, were enrolled in the Medicaid program
during the 1998 fiscal year.173  In addition to its far-reaching
implications in the Medicaid context, as pointed out in the previous
section, the impact of this case is not limited to Medicaid but rather
affects a host of other federal entitlement programs.174
Because these services are so important to the health and well-
being of such a vast number of Americans, this Comment encourages
the Supreme Court to continue to examine the Medicaid program
and other Spending Clause programs in order to more clearly define
the law and contract issues involved.  Rather than viewing the entire
program as solely in the nature of a contract, the Court should dissect
the constituent parts of the program and perform a true contract
analysis.  Such analysis reveals that, even if the Medicaid Act is not
supreme federal law initially, it becomes supreme law when a state
assures the federal government that it will comply with that law.  As
the Ex parte Young doctrine only functions where the underlying
federal law is supreme, this contract analysis maintains the
applicability of that doctrine to the Medicaid program.  In so doing,
this analysis preserves the only means by which Medicaid recipients
might force state officials to comply with the state’s legal obligations.
Furthermore, this analysis reestablishes § 1983 as a cause of action for

172. See Pear, supra note 6, at A14 (describing the Westside Mothers decision and the
reaction it received).  See supra note 99 (discussing the subsequent treatment of
Westside Mothers in other jurisdictions).
173. See Health Care Financing Administration, supra note 1, at 12.  The current
economic downturn and the events of September 11, 2001 have most certainly
increased these figures.  See Dale Russakoff, Out of Tragedy, N.Y. Finds Way to Treat
Medicaid Need, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2001, at A2 (reporting on the largest one-time
enrollment increase in Medicaid history in New York City after September 11, 2001);
see also Urban Institute, Rising Unemployment and Medicaid, 1 HEALTH POLICY ONLINE, 2
(Oct. 16, 2001), at http://www.urban.org/pdfs/HPOnline_1.pdf (last visited Jan. 3,
2002) (finding an increase in the unemployment rate from 4.5% to 5.5% would
increase Medicaid enrollment by 1.5 million people, including one million children,
and an unemployment rate increase to 6.5% would increase Medicaid enrollment by
3.3 million people).
174. See supra Part II.C (positing that Westside Mothers will adversely affect other
federal entitlement programs such as foodstamps, public housing, and education for
the disabled).
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Medicaid recipients to enforce their right, by clarifying that
recipients sue to vindicate not only their third-party beneficiary right,
but also their right to Medicaid services created by federal law.
